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he concept of “sticky prices” has been one of the most common expla-
nations for the perceived importance of monetary policy since at least
as far back as the 1930s. Simply put, if nominal prices for individual
goods do not continuously adjust to economic conditions, then it is natural to
think that monetary policy can inﬂuence the level of real economic activity
through its ability to determine the nominal quantity of money. In evaluating
whether this channel for monetary policy is important, two sets of research
questions are relevant. First, do individual prices indeed change infrequently,
and if so, why? Second, within macroeconomic models, what are the ag-
gregate implications of the pricing behavior found in the data, and are those
implications consistent with aggregate economic data? This article reviews
research on the ﬁrst set of questions in the hope of deriving lessons useful for
improving the macroeconomic models that can address the second set.1
Weiss (1993) and Wynne (1995) have written surveys on similar top-
ics. Weiss promotes the importance of infrequent price adjustment, whereas
Wynne is a skeptic. This article differs from their work in that it covers the
many papers that have appeared since 1995 and provides a history of thought
perspective on theories of infrequent price adjustment. Much of my previ-
ous research has involved sticky price models, so I have a stake in what the
evidence reveals.
I received helpful comments from Mike Dotsey, Martin Gervais, Andreas Hornstein, and
Thomas Humphrey. The ideas expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily
reﬂect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the Federal Reserve System.
1 I do not consider infrequent nominal wage adjustment. Loosely, the parts of my paper that
refer to repeated relationships can be thought of as applying to wages as well as prices.
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Table 1 Summary of Empirical Studies
Object of Study Authors
Retailers Lach and Tsiddon; R´ atfai; Slade;
Levy et al.; Dutta et al.
Periodicals Mussa; Weiss; Cecchetti; Willis
Industrial Products Carlton; Zbaracki et al.
BLS Averages for Wholesale Prices Mills; Means
Goods in Catalogs Kashyap
Large Number of Firms (through surveys) Blinder et al.; Buckle and Carlson;
Carlson; Hall, Walsh, and Yates
Researchonpricestickinesshasinvolvedcontinualinterplaybetweenthe-
ory and empiricism. The early empirical studies discussed below approach
“pure” empirical exercises. Research was not conducted in a vacuum, but
thesestudiesseemtohaveonlybroadtheoreticalmotivation, and—initially—
the results were not used to support particular theories. Subsequent theories
of pricing behavior were developed and reﬁned; the theory of explicit “menu”
costsofpriceadjustmenthasbeenmostsharplyreﬁned. Mostoftheempirical
work I survey was conducted with this theory as its organizing framework.
However, I also describe recent empirical work that takes a more naive ap-
proach, studying the pricing process at a large industrial ﬁrm. Together with
two surveys of ﬁrms’pricing behavior, this recent work relates to several less-
reﬁned theories of infrequent price adjustment. Table 1 lists the empirical
studies I survey.
Prices do change infrequently for many retail transactions. Furthermore,
priceadjustmentbehaviorappearstobeconsistentwithexplicit,directcostsof
changingprices. Evidenceofinfrequentpricechangesalsoexistsfornonretail
transactions, but the costs associated with price adjustment are not as easy to
pin down. New evidence, supplementing years of conjecture, suggests that
these costs involve the repeated nature of many buyer-seller relationships.
The main challenges ahead are to improve both measurement, so that we
better understand the nature of buyer-seller relationships, and theory, to study
the macroeconomic implications of such relationships. It is not clear that
conclusions about monetary policy based on direct costs of price change will
carryovertomodelswhereinfrequentpricechangeresultspartlyfromrepeated
relationships.A. L. Wolman: Individual PriceAdjustment 3
1. MILLS’S DATAAND “ADMINISTERED PRICES”
Frederick Mills (1927) published what may be the ﬁrst study of the frequency
of price changes. He documented the behavior of wholesale price quotations
for more than two hundred goods, using data from the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics’ wholesale price bulletins covering the period from 1890 to 1926. The
broadrangeofgoodsinMills’sbookmakesitavaluablesource: hecoversev-
erything from cotton yarn (“Carded, white, mulespun, northern, cones, 10/1”)
to doorknobs (“Steel, bronze-plated”). A drawback to Mills’s data, however,
is that it is stated at a monthly frequency, with the monthly observations either
taken one day per month or as an average of daily or weekly observations.
Some of the measurements of price-change frequency are thus inaccurate, al-
though prices that change less than once per month must be fairly accurately
represented. Furthermore, the data on many of the goods were averages of
observations from multiple price reporters—BLS ﬁeld workers who recorded
prices.
Mills’s basic ﬁnding is that the frequency of price changes varies widely
across goods: Excluding the years 1914–1921, roughly one-ﬁfth of the goods
changed price in less than 10 percent of months, while another one-ﬁfth
changed price in more than 90 percent of months. Mills pointed out that
the distribution of price-change frequencies was bimodal (U-shaped), but did
notspeculateonthecausesorimplicationsofhisﬁndings. InreviewingMills’s
book, John Maynard Keynes (1983 [1928], p. 226) wrote, “[i]t is the pecu-
liarity of Mr. Mills that he starts without any theories and ends without any,
being content to set out his material for the beneﬁt of those who have less
taste than he has for laborious investigation, and more taste for theorising.”
Keynes surely was one who had a taste for “theorising,” but his review simply
summarizes parts of the book, emphasizing dispersion in relative prices more
than the frequency of price changes.
It was up to Gardiner Means, in 1935 an adviser to the U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture, to impose an interpretation on Mills’s material. Means’s data is
similar to that studied by Mills except that it is for the years 1926–1933—
a period covering the early part of the Great Depression. Not surprisingly,
that data has the same bimodal distribution for the frequency of price change
noted by Mills. Means provided an interpretation that relied heavily on this
feature of the data: “There are two essentially different types of market in
operation—thetraditionalmarketinwhichsupplyanddemandareequatedby
a ﬂexible price and the administered market in which production and demand
are equated at an inﬂexible administered price” (Means 1935). Means went
on to argue that inﬂexible, administered prices had grown in importance as
the economy had become more industrialized and were largely responsible
for the severity of the Great Depression.
The“administeredprice”thesisspurredavoluminousliterature,andMeans
became known as “one of the most inﬂuential economists in the history of4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
this country” (Stigler and Kindahl 1973, p. 717). Although Means’s theory
evolved over the years, it never clearly deﬁned administered prices. Stigler
andKindahlwrotethat“Means’theoryhasindeedbecomedifﬁculttorefuteor
conﬁrm. ...The implications have become so broad as to be almost uselessly
vague”(1973,p. 719). EventhefundamentalobservationsthatdroveMeans’s
theorizing were shown to be suspect or false. First, Tucker (1938) used other
datasourcestoarguethatpriceschangedlessfrequentlyinthenineteenthcen-
tury than during the 1929–1933 period. Second, Scitovszky (1941) pointed
out that the U-shaped distribution of price-change frequencies was an artifact
ofthedataformat. BothMills’sandMeans’sdataweremonthly, soanyprices
that changed more than once per month were recorded as changing monthly;
had they been recorded at, say, daily frequency, one end of the distribution
would have ﬂattened out. A similar argument can be made for the other end
of the distribution, although Scitovszky did not discuss it. Any price that did
not change during the sample period is treated identically, whereas if the sam-
ple were long enough, many of these items would be seen to have different
frequencies of price change.
Although the bimodal distribution was spurious, Means was correct in
pointing out that many prices change infrequently (he found this to be the
case even for many goods that had more than one reporter). Furthermore,
while Means did not clearly deﬁne “administered prices,” it may be a useful
term. The prices of many goods are changed only as a result of conscious
decision by an individual or group of individuals, that is, by administration.
And one would expect that “administrative costs” might lead to infrequent
price change. In the next section I summarize a mature literature that makes
explicit one narrow form of administrative costs. Subsequently, I will discuss
a nascent literature that can be interpreted as resurrecting a richer notion of
administered prices and studying the process of administration.
2. EXPLICIT COSTS OF PRICEADJUSTMENT
The best-developed theory of infrequent price changes is also the simplest.
This theory combines some monopoly power on the part of ﬁrms with explicit
physical costs of changing nominal prices. Because these costs are usually
assumed to be ﬁxed (independent of the magnitude of the price change), they
are often referred to as “menu costs.” Firms with monopoly power have
leeway to choose the price of their products. The physical costs of changing
prices will make ﬁrms choose to change prices infrequently as long as the
costs have a signiﬁcant component that is ﬁxed, or sufﬁciently concave in the
size of the price change.2 The idea behind this theory is straightforward, so
2 If there are costs of changing prices, but those costs are convex in the size of the price
change, then ﬁrms will choose to change their prices a little bit every chance they get rather than
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there is a large body of work analyzing its implications. The theoretical work
has led to empirical work studying both the length of time prices are ﬁxed
and the costs of changing prices. As a form of administrative costs, menu
costs are distinguished in that they are mechanical: ﬁrms can be thought of as
contracting out the printing of menus, knowing exactly what the cost will be.
The Theory
Robert Barro (1972) was the ﬁrst to study a formal theoretical model of a
ﬁrm facing explicit ﬁxed costs of changing its price. According to Barro,
“Shifts in price involve direct administrative costs to the producer (seller). ...
The administrative costs associated with price changes are straightforward,
and can reasonably be described as a lump sum amount, independent of the
size or direction of adjustment” (1972, p. 21). Sheshinski and Weiss (1977,
1983, 1992) made important contributions to understanding the behavior of
ﬁrms facing ﬁxed costs of price adjustment, as did Danziger (1987, 1988) and
Kuran (1983). Caplin and Spulber (1987) initiated the formal analysis of the
effects of monetary policy in models with ﬁxed costs of price adjustment, and
surprisingly they found that although costs of price adjustment made ﬁrms
change their prices infrequently, the price level moved one-for-one with the
money supply, implying monetary neutrality. Subsequent developments by
Caplin and Leahy (1991, 1997), Caballero and Engel (1993), Dotsey, King,
and Wolman (1999), and Danziger (1999) suggest that Caplin and Spulber’s
ﬁnding is not robust, i.e., that monetary policy can and generally does have
real effects in menu-cost models.3 While these articles have extended Barro’s
analysisinimportantways, theyhaveallmaintainedthebasicassumptionthat
there is a direct cost to ﬁrms of changing the nominal price of products they
sell.
Although no one until Barro incorporated the idea into a formal model,
economists discussed explicit costs of price adjustment as early as the 1930s.
Note that Barro uses the term “administrative costs.” Explicit costs of price
adjustment do not appear in Means’s written work, but in a 1936 article John
Kenneth Galbraith referred to private communication with Means that indi-
cates Means—and Galbraith—thought about menu-type costs:
Professor Gardiner C. Means has drawn my attention to the cost of making
a price change under modern conditions as an incentive to the holding
of prices constant. A concern with nation-wide sales outlets must make
certain that dealers are informed of the change; it must distribute new
price schedules and provide safeguards against “leaks” as well as risk a
temporary cessation of business in case there is such a “leak.” It must
3 This is not an exhaustive list of references.6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
also recast its advertising to acquaint the public with the change. All of
these things cost money and all of this expenditure is avoided if prices
are allowed to stay where they are. (p. 470)
Galbraith describes a rich array of costs in this paragraph. The cost to
“distribute new price schedules” corresponds most closely to the menu-type
cost incorporated in most theoretical work since Barro; other costs Galbraith
describes have a different ﬂavor, and I return to them below. Another early
reference to costs of price adjustment can be found in Scitovszky (1941). He
writes that “the adjustment of price policies and of production often involves
high subjective costs—not only for administrative and technical but also for
political reasons.” He then cites a 1935 survey article on monopoly theory
by John Hicks as a source for the idea of administrative and technical costs.
The relevant passage from Hicks reads, in part, “[T]he variation in monopoly
proﬁt for some way on either side of the highest proﬁt output may often be
small ... and if this is so, the subjective costs involved in securing a close
adaptation to the most proﬁtable output may well outweigh the meagre gains
offered” (1935, p. 8). Hicks’s argument is framed in terms of output, but it is
clear that a similar argument could be made based on price.
Hicks anticipates arguments made by Akerlof andYellen (1985a, b) and
Mankiw (1985). Like Hicks, these authors note that the nature of optimal
behavior often implies that small deviations from optimality will have a small
effectonamonopolist’sproﬁts. Asmallcostofadjustingpricemaythenmake
itoptimalforaﬁrmtokeepitspriceﬁxedforseveralperiods. Thisisprecisely
the idea that has been formalized in the literature initiated by Barro (1972),
and Hicks came close to elucidating it in 1935. The unique contribution of
AkerlofandYellenandMankiwwastoshowthatundercertainconditions, the
implications of small costs to individual ﬁrms could be large for the economy
as a whole.
Models in which there are explicit costs of price adjustment have three
main empirical implications. First, trivially, there are explicit costs to chang-
ing individual prices, and because of these costs prices will not be changed
continuously. Second, individual prices will change more frequently when
the beneﬁts to adjusting price are high or the costs are low. And third, the
frequency of price adjustment should be high (low) when the inﬂation rate
is high (low) because inﬂation causes the beneﬁt to changing prices to rise
over time. Many empirical studies have been motivated by menu-cost-type
models of costly price adjustment, and they focus primarily on these main
implications.
Empirical Evidence from High Inﬂation Episodes
Several authors have studied individual price data generated under conditions
where there is great variation in the inﬂation rate. Such data are especiallyA. L. Wolman: Individual PriceAdjustment 7
interesting for evaluating menu-cost models because of the predicted positive
relationship between inﬂation and the frequency of price change.
Mussa (1981) and Weiss (1993) describe newspaper prices during 1920s
German hyperinﬂation. Between 1920 and 1923, as the German inﬂation rate
rose to more than 10,000 percent per month, the cover prices of three news-
papers changed with increasing frequency; however, even in the months of
highest inﬂation those prices appear not to have changed every day.4 Weiss
also describes the behavior of an Israeli newspaper’s price during a period of
rising inﬂation from 1972 to 1984, and one sees the same qualitative features
as in the German data. A drawback to looking at data on daily newspaper
prices is that single copy sales of newspapers are not the only source of rev-
enue associated with a newspaper. It is possible that subscription prices were
indexed to inﬂation, and advertising may have been an important source of
revenue. Presumably, though, somecopiesofthenewspaperwereindeedpur-
chased at the printed price, so the behavior of that price does provide support
for the existence of costs of price adjustment.
In a series of papers beginning in 1992, Saul Lach and Daniel Tsiddon
study the behavior of the prices of 26 foodstuffs at grocery stores in Israel,
during three subperiods between 1978 and 1984. As with newspapers in
Israel during roughly the same period, food prices were changed infrequently,
and the frequency responded to the overall inﬂation rate. As inﬂation rose
from a 4.9 percent monthly rate in 1978–1979 to a 6.6 percent monthly rate
during the 1981–1982 subperiod, the average duration of a price fell from 2.2
monthsto1.5months. Thesebasicfactsonthedurationofpricequotationsare
presentedinLachandTsiddon(1992); inthatarticleandtheir1996papersthe
authors also provide some deeper insights into the implications of their data.
Amongthefeaturesofthedatatheydiscussisthedistributionofrelativeprices.
Caplin and Spulber’s early menu-cost model generates a uniform distribution
ofprices,whereasLachandTsiddonﬁndaunimodaldistribution. Thisﬁnding
does not mean that Lach and Tsiddon’s data are inconsistent with menu-cost
models; more general models, such as that in Dotsey, King, and Wolman
(1999), generate nonuniform distributions. However, even Dotsey, King, and
Wolman’s model would need to be extended—for example, with additional
ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks—to generate the type of distributions found by Lach and
Tsiddon.5 For some goods, they ﬁnd that there are small price changes, but
4 Weiss’s data are in the form of a time series plot, for the newspapers Germania and Tage-
blatt. These data end in July 1923. Mussa displays the dates of price changes for the Neue
Preussische Zeitung, for the period ending November 17, 1923, close to the date of monetary
reform.
5 The difﬁculty is that Lach and Tsiddon ﬁnd nearly symmetric distributions, whereas Dotsey,
King, and Wolman’s model predicts that in an inﬂationary world the mode should be at the highest
price charged. Eden (forthcoming) also analyzes Lach and Tsiddon’s data. He argues that the
relationship between relative price variability and inﬂation in the data is inconsistent with Dotsey,
King, and Wolman’s model.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
the average price change for a given store is not small (1996b). Evidence of
many small price changes would typically be seen as conﬂicting with menu-
cost models, but Lach and Tsiddon argue that this evidence is consistent with
models where the cost incurred is for changing the entire menu of a store’s
prices. And indeed, they ﬁnd that price changes are generally synchronized
within a ﬁrm, but not for a given good across ﬁrms (1996a).
R´ atfai (2000) studies the behavior of meat prices in Hungary. His data
cover 14 speciﬁc products sold in 8 stores from 1993 through 1996. Observa-
tions are at the monthly frequency. During this period annual CPI inﬂation in
Hungary varied between 16 percent and 30 percent. The average duration of
the meat price quotations was three months. Another measure of price change
frequency is that in 58 percent of the observations, price was unchanged from
the previous month. R´ atfai provides data on both the overall inﬂation rate
and different measures of the frequency of price adjustment over time. The
data show a positive relationship, as predicted by theory. R´ atfai also provides
a detailed description of the distribution of price changes by size. His data
appear consistent with ﬁxed costs of price adjustment in that one does not
observe many tiny adjustments.
Empirical Evidence from Moderate Inﬂation Eras
Menu-cost models make sharp predictions about periods in which the average
inﬂation rate changes dramatically. Periods when inﬂation is moderate and
relatively steady lend themselves to different analysis. One can still measure
thefrequencyofpriceadjustmentandthedistributionofpricechanges. Menu-
cost models predict that price changes will be infrequent and large rather than
frequentandsmall,butthispredictionneedstobequaliﬁedinlightofLachand
Tsiddon’s analysis of multiproduct ﬁrms. In effect, their work teaches us that
itwillbedifﬁculttorejectmenu-costmodels; evidenceofsmallpricechanges
does not necessarily mean that menu costs are unimportant. In addition to
documentingthebehaviorofindividualprices,researchershavealsoattempted
to measure menu costs, both directly and indirectly.
Ofallthestudiesofpriceadjustmentfrequencyfromdatageneratedunder
moderateinﬂation,AnilKashyap’s(1995)analysisofpricesincatalogscovers
the longest period of time, from 1953 to 1987. Kashyap traces the prices of
12 items in total from L.L.Bean, Orvis and REI catalogs. Some of the items
were sold during the entire 35-year period, while others were sold for as little
as 12 years of the sample. All of these merchants ﬁx their catalog prices for
a minimum of six months at a time, but prices of the 12 items in Kashyap’s
study changed even less frequently. The Orvis binoculars changed price most
frequently—every11.2monthsonaverage—andtheOrvisﬁshingﬂychanged
priceleastfrequently—every30.4months. Eventheitemsthatchangedprices
relatively frequently on average had lengthy episodes without a price change.A. L. Wolman: Individual PriceAdjustment 9
Theaforementionedbinocularswentfor42monthsfrom1968to1971without
a price change, and the L.L.Bean camp moccasin—which had a price change
every 11.5 months on average—went for 78 months without a price change
from 1959 to 1965. Kashyap also ﬁnds that there are many examples of small
price changes. Given Lach and Tsiddon’s ﬁndings regarding synchronization
across and within ﬁrms, it is interesting to know what Kashyap’s data reveal
along these lines. Overall, he ﬁnds little evidence of synchronization in price
changes; however, there are too few goods per catalog in his study to reach
robustconclusionsaboutsynchronizationwithinacatalog. Kashyap’sﬁndings
are somewhat troubling with respect to standard menu-cost models. Each of
the ﬁrms chooses to incur a menu cost (print a new catalog) twice per year.
Standard models would predict the cost being incurred only when optimal. It
seemsclear,though,thatthecomplicatingfactorforcatalogretailersisthatthe
menucostisincurredinconjunctionwithmarketingactivities, andmarketing,
as opposed to price changes, may be the dominant factor in determining the
semiannual frequency.
JohnA.Carlson(1992)usesdatafromaquarterlysurveyconductedbythe
National Federation of Independent Business, covering the years 1979–1990.
He presents both prospective and retrospective information on ﬁrms’ price-
changing behavior. The prospective information is in the form of responses
to the question, “In the next three months, do you plan to change the average
sellingpriceofyourgoodsand/orservices?”6 Retrospectively,ﬁrmsareasked,
“How are your average selling prices now compared to three months ago?” In
the ﬁrst two years of the sample, when inﬂation was relatively high, between
30 percent and 45 percent of ﬁrms reported that their prices had remained
constant and had been expected to remain constant over the previous three
months. As predicted by the existence of menu costs, in the lower inﬂation
period from 1983 to 1990, these numbers stabilized at a higher level: between
55percentand75percentofﬁrmsreportedconstantactualandexpectedprices
over the prior three months.
RobertA.BuckleandCarlson(2000)reportonasimilarsurveyconducted
by the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research. The Quarterly Survey of
BusinessOpinionasksexecutivesofmanufacturingandbuildingﬁrmswhether
the direction of price change in the last three months has been up, same, or
down. For all ﬁrms in the survey, the average duration of a price is reported
to be 6.7 months. The authors also split up their sample by ﬁrm size. They
ﬁnd that the smallest ﬁrms in the sample keep their prices ﬁxed on average for
50 percent longer than the largest ﬁrms. Those estimates are probably impre-
cise. Survey respondents are generally considering the price of more than one
product, so their responses may reﬂect these products’average behavior. The
6 See Carlson (1992, p. 325).10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
category “unchanged” may be chosen for average changes that are considered
small. Nonetheless, it is notable that small ﬁrms seem to keep their prices
ﬁxed longer. Buckle and Carlson argue that this suggests that costs of price
adjustment do not vary much across ﬁrms: large ﬁrms reap a greater beneﬁt
from adjusting their price and hence adjust more often.
Stephen Cecchetti (1985, 1986) documents the behavior of 38 U.S. mag-
azine cover prices between 1953 and 1979. The prices are measured annually,
with the ﬁrst issue of each year. From year to year, the number of maga-
zines that changed their price ranges from 3 percent of the total, in 1953, to
50 percent of the total, in 1974. In the 1950s (1953–1959), 12 percent of
the magazines changed their price in an average year, while in the 1970s—a
period of higher inﬂation—30 percent of the magazines changed their price
in an average year. Cecchetti’s evidence is thus both consistent with the evi-
denceonnewspaperpricesinGermanyandIsraeland, becausemagazinessell
subscriptions and advertisements, subject to the same caveat. Cecchetti goes
beyond simple descriptive statistics to estimate a complicated price-setting
model. While his estimates are consistent with the existence of menu costs,
he concludes that menu costs are not the whole story. The total costs of price
adjustment depend on the size of the price change. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the idea of “customer costs” of price adjustment, which are discussed
below.
Willis (2000) uses Cecchetti’s magazine price data to estimate the menu
costs of price adjustment. His estimation method begins by specifying an ex-
plicit intertemporal optimization problem for each magazine. Next, reduced-
formhazardfunctionsareestimated,whichrepresenttheprobabilityofaprice
change as a function of a small number of aggregate and magazine-speciﬁc
variables. Then, an indirect inference procedure is used to match up the
reduced-form estimates with structural parameters. Willis ﬁnds that the aver-
age adjustment cost is 4 percent of revenues. I have already discussed the fact
thatmagazinesgeneraterevenuefromsubscriptionsandadvertising,aswellas
single-issuesales. ItisdifﬁculttointerpretWillis’sresultsbecauseadmarket-
ing and price discrimination between subscribers and newsstand purchasers
may inﬂuence the cover-pricing decision. Nonetheless, Willis’s method is a
promising one.
Slade (1998) combines a dynamic model of optimal price setting with
sophisticated econometric methods to estimate the costs of price adjustment
for particular goods. She uses weekly data for 1984–1985 on saltine prices
andsalesattensupermarkets. Pricesettersfaceproﬁtmaximizationproblems
similar to those studied in the literature following Barro (1972) except that
there is a role for “goodwill” in their decisions. Goodwill enters the demand
function faced by ﬁrms, and it rises and falls according to whether price is
above or below a “normal” level. Slade’s estimation framework allows for
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beingestimatedrepresentallcostsofpriceadjustment. Thatis, thetheoretical
frameworkmaintainsthatthereareﬁxedandvariablecostsofpriceadjustment,
and it does not break down those costs according to whether they are menu
costs or anything else. Slade reports that price remains unchanged about 80
percent of the time. She estimates that the average cost of a price change for
a box of saltines is $2.72, with 94 percent of those costs ﬁxed with respect to
the size of the price change. When broken down by store, the average ﬁxed
costs range from $2.17 to $3.09, and when broken down by brand, they range
from $2.15 to $2.68. A national chain has the lowest costs, an independent
store has the highest costs, and two regional chains are in the middle.7
Two recent papers on individual price adjustment are concerned mainly
with measuring the costs of price adjustment, although both provide some
information on the frequency of price adjustment for individual goods. Levy
et al. (1997) and Dutta et al. (1999) study price adjustment at supermarkets
and drugstores, respectively. In both cases, the data source is a company that
sells electronic shelf-label systems. As part of its sales effort, the company
hasundertakendetailedstudiesofthepricingpracticesofsomeofitspotential
customers. Included in the studies is information on both the frequency and
the costs of price adjustment.
Levy et al. ﬁnd that four supermarket chains change the prices of ap-
proximately 16 percent of their products each week, while a ﬁfth chain only
changes the prices of 6 percent of its products each week. The chain with
fewer price changes also happens to be located in a state that requires each
item to carry its own price tag—which raises the cost of price adjustment.
Because the sales pitch of the electronic shelf-label system’s manufacturer
promises in part to save retailers money on their pricing process, we might ex-
pect the manufacturer’s estimates of the direct costs of price adjustment to be
too high. In each case, however, the estimates were reviewed by the retailers
themselves, who apparently did not strongly disagree with the manufacturer.8
On the other hand, we should not expect good estimates of any costs of price
adjustment other than menu costs from these studies: the manufacturer of
electronic labeling systems has no incentive to measure additional costs. To
theextentthatothercostsofpriceadjustmentarehigh,thebeneﬁtsofreducing
thedirectcostsofpriceadjustmentwillbesmaller. Theretailerwouldsaveon
the existing amount of price adjustment, but might not choose to signiﬁcantly
increase the frequency of its price adjustment.
Levy et al. report that the physical costs of price adjustment average
0.70 percent of store revenues. Proﬁt margins are small in the supermarket
7 In Slade’s paper, it is the manufacturers that are setting price. The statement that “a national
chain has the lowest costs,” for example, means that the manufacturer’s cost of changing price at
that chain are lower than at other chains.
8 The electronic shelf-label system illustrates that technology affects the costs of price adjust-
ment.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
industry—the authors assume an average of 2 percent—meaning that menu
costs are estimated to be 35 percent of proﬁts. They also estimate that chang-
ing the price of a speciﬁc item costs 52/ c on average for four of the chains
in their sample and $1.33 for the ﬁfth chain. As mentioned above, the ﬁfth
chain is subject to laws requiring that all items carry price tags, and it changes
prices much less frequently than the others. More than 70 percent of the costs
of changing price are labor costs. The source data for this study do not in-
clude information about the head ofﬁce managerial costs of price adjustment.
However, based on their own knowledge of this industry, the authors estimate
these managerial costs at 6.8 percent of the total costs of price adjustment.
It is notable that estimated cost per price change is much lower for Levy et
al. than for Slade. There are at least three potential explanations for this dis-
crepancy. First, saltinesmaybeitemswithparticularlyhighmenucosts; Levy
et al. do not provide data on individual goods. Second, Levy et al. may not
be measuring certain forms of price adjustment costs. Finally, Slade’s model
may be misspeciﬁed, resulting in cost estimates that are too high.
With respect to the drugstore chain, Dutta et al. ﬁnd that prices change on
7.5 percent of the products in an average week. They report similar estimates
of the costs of changing prices for drugstores to those found for supermarkets,
withthedirectcostsofpriceadjustmentestimatedtobe0.74percentofrevenue
and 27 percent of proﬁts. Changing the price of a speciﬁc item is estimated
to cost 42/ c on average. Based on these numbers, it is not clear whether
one would describe menu costs as higher for supermarkets or drugstores. It
is worth noting, then, that the frequency of price change is much lower in
drugstores than in supermarkets. It must be that either unmeasured costs of
price adjustment are higher for drugstores or the standard notion of proﬁts is
less sensitive to price for drugstores than for supermarkets.
A Skeptical View
The papers discussed in this section generally support the idea that prices
are changed infrequently because of ﬁxed costs of price adjustment. Like
many of these studies, Carlton (1986) presents evidence that individual prices
changeinfrequently. However, hispreferredinterpretationisnotthatthereare
physical costs to price adjustment.
Carlton’s data set was compiled by George Stigler and James Kindahl.
They used the data for a 1970 book that was in large part a critical response to
Gardiner Means. The principal drawback to the BLS data analyzed by Mills
and Means is that much of it is averaged over multiple sellers. For their book,
Stigler and Kindahl gathered data from individual purchasers in industries
similartothosestudiedbyMeans. Theychose, however, toconcentrateonthe
“goods-level” data rather than the transactions-level data. Carlton studied this
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used in manufacturing. There are 11 different product groups, including steel,
truck motors, glass, and cement. The average duration of price rigidity across
the product groups ranges from 5.9 months (household appliances) to 19.2
months (chemicals). These data thus show strong evidence of infrequent
price changes.
Long average intervals between price changes do not necessarily imply
that ﬁxed costs of price adjustment are important. Carlton shows that in the
Stigler-Kindahldatatherearemanyinstancesofsmallpricechanges, whichis
inconsistent with simple menu-cost models. Richer menu-cost models allow
ﬁxed costs of changing price to vary across ﬁrms, and Carlton acknowledges
that this may be one factor in explaining the data. However, he also empha-
sizes a fundamentally different explanation, that “ﬁrms and buyers differ in
their need to rely on the price system to achieve allocative efﬁciency” (1986,
pp. 648–49). Carlton spells out this idea further in a 1989 essay, arguing that
price adjustment alone is a good way to clear markets for some homogeneous
goods. For other goods, especially in the presence of long-term relationships,
efﬁcient allocations may be achieved at lower cost by varying other character-
istics, such as quality or delivery time. From this perspective, there is nothing
special about adjusting price versus adjusting other characteristics. The ob-
servation that prices do not change frequently in a particular market tells us
something about the nature of that market, but it does not necessarily imply
that there are high physical costs of price adjustment.9 Carlton’s analysis is
important to bear in mind when confronted with data about the frequency of
price adjustment alone; however, his analysis must be weighed against those
that actually measure price adjustment costs.
3. ADMINISTERED PRICES REHABILITATED
Menu costs are one form of administrative price adjustment cost. Econo-
mists have been drawn to studying menu costs because it has been relatively
straightforward both to measure them (in principle) and to incorporate them
in rich dynamic models. However, the idea of menu costs overlooks the
administrative process, which may be costly. It also ignores the possibility
that ﬁrms may face indirect costs of changing their prices, related to the
effect of a price change on consumer behavior.10 A recent empirical paper by
Zbaracki et al. (2000) studies costs of the administrative process and indirect
9 The implications for monetary policy of Carlton’s explanation for rigid prices are unclear.
In the context of labor markets, Barro (1977) has argued that a similar explanation for infrequent
(wage) adjustment overturns the idea that monetary policy has real effects. Without understand-
ing the precise features of the market that lead nominal prices to go unchanged, however, this
conclusion seems tenuous.
10 These changes in consumer behavior represent something other than movement along a
smooth demand curve, as will be seen below.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
costs associated with changing customer behavior, as well as menu costs. As
I describe this empirical work, I will give some more detailed background on
the theoretical basis for indirect costs of price adjustment.
Zbaracki et al. report on an intensive analysis of a large industrial cor-
poration that sells more than a thousand products. The authors studied this
corporation for two years with the objective of learning about the ﬁrm’s price-
setting process. Their study follows a “‘discovery oriented’perspective” and
is geared toward understanding what the authors refer to as managerial costs
and customer costs of price adjustment, as well as physical costs (2000, p. 4).
In their terminology, physical costs correspond roughly to menu costs—they
arecostsofprintinganddistributingpricelists,bothhardcopiesandelectronic
versions. Managerial costs are those costs incurred during the long process—
four months for this corporation—of choosing list prices for the upcoming
year. Customer costs are divided into “hard” and “soft” costs; hard customer
costs are similar to managerial costs, except that the former are incurred after
list prices have been set. These costs involve communicating with customers
regarding new prices. Soft customer costs are described as “potential harm to
customer relationships and company reputation” (2000, p. 19).
TheideaofsoftcustomercostsrecallsoneofthecostslistedbyGalbraith,
that of the risk of lost business. These costs are indirect, and the “risk of lost
business” is the risk that even a small price change will cause a discrete shift
in demand. Absent physical costs of changing price, such factors would still
make it optimal for ﬁrms to keep their prices ﬁxed in the face of small enough
changes in demand and supply conditions. Although the idea of indirect costs
was perhaps implicit in Means’s work and the literature he inspired, clear
statements can ﬁrst be found in Sweezy (1939) and Hall and Hitch (1939).
Theseauthorsdevelopedthe“kinkeddemandcurve”theoryofoligopoly. This
theorypositsthatadecreaseinpricewillnotgainaﬁrmverymanycustomers,
but an increase in price will cause it to lose many customers. Faced with this
situation, a ﬁrm will choose to maintain a ﬁxed price in response to modest
changes in market conditions. Stigler (1947) cast doubt on the simple kinked
demandtheorybutcouldnotkillit. Alargerecentliteraturestudiesconditions
under which models with consumer search imply that ﬁrms’ demand curves
will be endogenously kinked at some initial price.11 Informal discussions of
thisideacanbefoundinOkun(1981);seeStiglitz(1989)foradiscussionofthe
more technical literature. Because models of consumer search are relatively
complicated,theoristshavemadelessprogressinstudyingthemacroeconomic
implications of “customer costs” than direct costs; see, however, Woglom
(1982), Goodfriend (1997) and Benabou (1988, 1992). As for empirical work
11A major stumbling block in this literature has been the issue of how the ﬁrm’s “initial
price” is determined.A. L. Wolman: Individual PriceAdjustment 15
studying indirect costs of price adjustment, Zbaracki et al. is one of the few
examples.
TheﬁrmstudiedbyZbarackietal.hasanannualprice-settingcycle. Each
month it sends out an updated pricing sheet, but very rarely does that sheet list
changed prices. Although the goods at the industrial corporation of Zbaracki
et al. are very different from the catalog items studied by Kashyap, in both
cases the ﬁrms often choose not to change prices even when new “price lists”
are distributed. The authors estimate the physical costs of price adjustment to
be 0.04 percent of revenue and 0.7 percent of net margin. Managerial costs
of price adjustment are 0.28 percent of revenue and 4.6 percent of net margin.
Finally, hard customer costs of price adjustment are 9.1 percent of revenue
and 15 percent of net margin.
Zbaracki et al. do not attempt to quantify soft customer costs, but they
do provide a qualitative discussion of these costs, which is consistent with
modern versions of kinked demand theory. According to a salesperson at the
ﬁrm, “every time you have one of these price changes you have to go in there
and you are opening a Pandora’s box” (2000, p. 26). In other words, enacting
a price change can have severe consequences for customer relationships.
NotethatinZbarackietal., physicalcostsareonlyone-seventhaslargeas
managerialcosts,whichsharplycontrastswiththeestimatesforsupermarkets,
where Levy et al. report that physical costs are roughly nine times as large as
managerial costs. On one level, it is perhaps not surprising that managerial
costs are relatively higher for the industrial corporation. Supermarket chains
have one headquarters supporting hundreds of retail outlets, and the physical
costs of price changes must be incurred at every retail outlet. At the industrial
corporation, there are no retail outlets, so physical costs are small. This
explains why the ratio of managerial costs to physical costs should be larger
for the industrial corporation than for the supermarkets. However, it does not
explain why managerial costs should be so much larger as a percentage of
revenues at an industrial corporation. This differential suggests that pricing is
more difﬁcult at the industrial company than at supermarkets. To the extent
thatthesupermarkethasnumerouscompetitorswithreadilyobservableprices,
perhaps it is not surprising that pricing is more difﬁcult for the industrial
corporation.
Themoststrikingaspectofthesenumbersisthemagnitudeofthecustomer
costs of price adjustment. Hard customer costs of price adjustment are 28
times as large as physical costs and managerial costs combined. Recall that
there was no mention of customer costs in the studies of supermarkets and
drugstores. In the latter industries, there are many customers, each of whom
is small. Hence, essentially no resources are expended communicating with16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
customers on an individual basis.12 In contrast, the corporation studied by
Zbaracki et al. has only about 1,400 customers. Almost three hundred of the
largest customers receive some individualized attention as the new price lists
are introduced, and any of the customers will receive some attention from a
salesperson if they complain about a price change.13
4. SURVEY EVIDENCE
Blinder et al. (1998) and Hall, Walsh, andYates (1997) have conducted large
surveys of ﬁrms’ pricing practices. These surveys sought quantitative infor-
mation about the frequency of price adjustment, and qualitative information
about the costs of price adjustment. In addition, the authors included ques-
tionsintheirsurveysaboutwhetherdifferenttheoriesofpriceadjustmentwere
deemed relevant.
Blinder et al.’s book describes the results of interviews the authors con-
ducted with roughly two hundred companies.14 The interviews were survey-
like in that they consisted of a common set of questions for all ﬁrms. Many of
the questions related to factors that inﬂuence ﬁrms’pricing behavior. Blinder
et al. also asked the ﬁrms how often they changed their prices. This question
seems to have been framed in a way that avoids the problem associated with
Buckle and Carlson’s (2000) survey data.15 Blinder et al. asked, “How often
do the prices of your most important products change in a typical year?” The
median number of price changes per year is 1.4; 10 percent of ﬁrms change
their prices less than once per year, 29 percent of ﬁrms change their prices
between two and four times per year, and 22 percent of ﬁrms change their
prices more than four times per year.
Blinder et al. also include questions aimed at ascertaining the nature of
any costs of price adjustment. They describe 12 theories of price stickiness
andaskﬁrmstoratetheimportanceofeachonefortheirownpricingpractices.
Some of their theories, such as procyclical elasticity of demand, cost-based
pricing, and constant marginal cost, relate not to infrequent price adjustment
but to “small” price adjustment. The most notable ﬁnding is that 65 per-
cent of ﬁrms report that they have implicit contracts with customers to keep
prices constant. “Implicit contracts” is a term usually used in the context of
employer-employee relationships. Blinder et al. use it to refer to the customer
costs that they trace to Okun (1981). That so many ﬁrms in the survey em-
phasize implicit contracts highlights the importance of repeated relationships
12 The Internet may be changing this, in conjunction with the large databases now available.
13 Of course, supermarkets also respond to customer complaints, but it seems unlikely that
a signiﬁcant number of complaints are related to price changes.
14 The titles of the interviewees ranged from Manager to CEO.
15 In Buckle and Carlson’s data, respondents may have been reporting averages across prod-
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in determining price behavior, for implicit contracts only arise when there are
repeated relationships. Repeated relationships show up in other responses to
the study as well: 38 percent of ﬁrms report having explicit nominal contracts
with customers. Furthermore, one-quarter of the ﬁrms report that they were
inhibited from changing prices because they would antagonize customers and
thereby lose future sales.16 As for the direct menu costs of price adjustment,
thesearestatedtobeimportantbymorethan25percentoftheﬁrmssurveyed.17
Simon Hall, Mark Walsh, and AnthonyYates (1997) conducted a survey
similar to Blinder et al.’s for the United Kingdom. They obtained written re-
sponsestoaquestionnairefrom654companies. Thequestionaboutfrequency
of price change was, “In the last twelve months, how many times have you
actually changed the price of your main product?” Roughly 6 percent of ﬁrms
responded that they had not changed their price in the last year, 44 percent
changed their price between two and four times, and 14 percent changed their
pricemorethanfourtimes.18 Hall,Walsh,andYates’ssurveyincludessomeof
the same questions asked by Blinder et al. about theories of pricing. However,
they only ask ﬁrms whether various general theories are important for their
own pricing practices, not about details related to speciﬁc theories. In com-
ments on a preliminary paper by Blinder, Blanchard (1994, p. 150) criticizes
“theory recognition” questions: “The image ... that recurs throughout my
reading of the results is, that confronted with the twelve statements, the ﬁrms
often had the reaction: ‘Now that you say it, yes, maybe that is kind of what
we do.’” If one is sympathetic to Blanchard’s view, then some of Hall,Walsh,
and Yates’s results are quite striking. Several of the theories mentioned by
Hall, Walsh, andYates were recognized as relevant by less than one-quarter
of ﬁrms, and the least recognized theory was that of physical menu costs, with
only 7.3 percent recognition. As Blanchard notes, however, and as I have
discussed above, theoretical work has shown that menu costs that are small
from the ﬁrm’s perspective may nonetheless have signiﬁcant macroeconomic
implications. Therefore, it is probably unwise to ignore evidence of small but
widespreaddirectpriceadjustmentcostsgleanedfromintensivestudiessolely
because of the survey evidence.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical research surveyed here leaves no doubt that the prices of many
goodschangeinfrequently(i.e.,aresticky)relativetothefrequencyofchanges
16 The distinction Blinder et al. make between fear of antagonizing customers and implicit
contracts is not clear.
17 One quarter of the ﬁrms stated that there were physical costs to price adjustment. Many
ﬁrms also reported managerial costs, but it is not possible to determine the amount of overlap
between these two groups of ﬁrms.
18 These numbers are approximate, as Hall, Walsh, and Yates provide graphical but not nu-
merical frequency distributions.18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in market conditions. I have, however, made no attempt to quantify a notion
such as the GDP-weighted frequency of price adjustment, which would be a
worthwhile endeavor. That prices do change only infrequently results from
one form or another of costs of price adjustment.19 The simplest type of price
adjustmentcosts,physicalmenucosts,areeasytoidentifyandstraightforward
to measure (though obtaining access to data may not be easy). These costs
are nontrivial for retailers, but limited evidence for the industrial corporation
studiedbyZbarackietal.suggeststhatmenucostsmaybequitesmallinother
sectors. For the same industrial corporation, other administrative costs of
price adjustment are quite large; these can be summarized as costs of the time
it takes managers to choose prices. More observations about these costs from
other ﬁrms would be valuable. The ﬁnal form of price adjustment costs I have
identiﬁed is more nebulous. Indirect customer costs involve a discrete shift
in demand when a ﬁrm changes a price. There is a long theoretical tradition
of studying such phenomena, but that tradition has not yet led to appealing
macroeconomicmodels. Again, theworkbyZbarackietal.suggeststhatsuch
costs do exist and that more work, both theoretical and empirical, is called for.
What do these ﬁndings tell us about macroeconomic modeling? It is an
oversimpliﬁcationtomodelallgoodsassymmetricwithrespecttopriceadjust-
ment frictions. This has been the standard approach in recent research using
sticky price models. Studying models where price adjustment is systemati-
cally less costly for some goods than others is straightforward. Incorporating
long-term relationships in a way that can generate endogenous price rigidity,
however, is a more important and less straightforward modeling extension.
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